Tor Onion Services: Configuration Introduction When following the instructions on this page, this exception does not apply. This is opt-in and not happening by default or accident.
An exception to this is if onion services are created by software running on Whonix-Workstation ™ (examples documented at the time of writing are ZeroNet, OnionShare and Bisq). Once the Whonix-Workstation ™ is cleaned, it is no longer possible for an adversary to impersonate the onion service. The reason is the key is stored on the Whonix-Gateway ™. 
Even if somebody hacks the hidden server software - such as micro-httpd, nginx, or apache - the attacker cannot steal the onion service key or bypass Tor see Attack on Whonix ™. It's so complex that without Whonix ™ or something similar to Whonix ™ is is most likely unavoidable to prevent an IP leak. Hosting onion services without Whonix ™ and not having an IP leak is very difficult. TCP ISN CPU Information Leak ProtectionĪll of the above are elaborate on above link. Why use Whonix ™ for Hosting Onion Services įrom the most relevant features are: 4.7 High Traffic Onion Service Scalability Performance. 4.6 Notes about End-to-end Security of Onion Services. 4.5 Onion Service Authentication Client Setup. 4.3 How Onion Services Connections Work. 
4.2 Onion Services Security Enhancements.4.1.4 OnionBalance Frontend Setup Part Two.4.1.2 OnionBalance Frontend Setup Part One.2.6.2.2 Step 2: Open Whonix-Workstation Firewall Port.2.6.2.1 Step 1: Install Server Software.2.6.1.7 Step 7: Backup the Tor Onion Service Private Key.2.6.1.6 Step 6: Retrieve the Onion Hostname.2.6.1.5 Step 5: Make Tor Configuration Changes Take Effect.2.6.1.4 Step 4: Denial of Service Mitigation Options.2.6.1.3 Step 3: Configure Onion Services Authentication.2.4 Web Server Software Recommendations.
1 Why use Whonix ™ for Hosting Onion Services.
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